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CharacterEvidence and the Juvenile Record
Terrence N. O'Donnell*

W

and is arrested for committing
a crime, should that act, committed while he is still a juvenile,
appear and reappear, to haunt the offender for the rest of his life?
There are some people in this country who say that we are not tough
enough with our young people. But even they would not want the life
of a young person marred forever by a mistake which he made as a
juvenile.
EEN A YOUNGSTER MAKES A MISTAKE

Scope of the Problem
The problem for discussion in this paper is whether or not evidence
of a prior juvenile conviction-a juvenile record-may ever, or should
ever, be admitted in evidence in an adult legal proceeding. Alternatively,
statutes (e.g., in the State of Ohio) specify that it may not, while the
line of cases herein presented indicates that there are times when evidence of a prior juvenile conviction may be, and ought to be, admissible
evidence in a later adult proceeding.
As indicated, the statutes of the State of Ohio, like those of California and New York for instance, are quite specific as to what things
may or may not be done with the record of a juvenile proceeding.
In Ohio, for example, when a Juvenile Court judgment is rendered
against an offender, that disposition or other evidence of the proceeding
is not admissible as evidence against the child in any other court proceeding except as to sentencing or as to granting probation.'
In New York, likewise, under the Family Court Act adopted in
1962, the fact that a juvenile has appeared before the court in a prior
proceeding, or any admission made by such person in Family Court,
2
is not admissible as evidence against him in any other court.
In California, also, the juvenile proceeding is not of public record,
as only interested parties may inspect the petition and reports of the
probation officer.3
Protection of Juveniles
Generally, care and protection are intended to be afforded youthful
offenders. In California, the avowed purpose of the court is to offer
care and guidance to the youth, and to preserve (or attempt to provide)
* B.A., Kent State University; Fourth-year student, Cleveland State University College of Law; Teacher at a Cleveland private school.
1 Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.358.
2 N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 783 (McKinney 1963).
3 Calif. Welf. and Inst. Code § 827 (West 1966).
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a wholesome family life for him. 4 In fact, provision is made in California to prohibit the youth from coming in contact with adult offenders. 5
In Ohio, five different types of juveniles and juvenile offenders
have been defined by statute,6 and it is interesting to note that, statutorily at least, none of the five types are classified as criminals.One whose car has been stolen, or whose daughter has been molested, may, with considerable cause, advocate severe punishment of the
criminal, since the age of the offender hardly mitigates the loss. The
logic of this reasoning escapes many state legislators, and they blame
society for the criminal activities of youth. Whether or not it be warranted, juvenile offenders are not criminals in Ohio. A similar provision is found in California, where it is not a crime for a youthful
offender to be adjudged a ward of the court, s and in New York, where
there is no forfeiture of personal rights for merely being adjudicated
delinquent by the Family Court. 9
Judge Zimmerman, in an Ohio Supreme Court case involving a sixteen year old who was indicted by the grand jury for first degree
murder and who was tried as an adult, elaborated on the view that
children who break the law or commit crimes are not criminals. He
explained that misdeeds of children are not viewed by the court as
criminal in nature, nor treated as actions of adults. Instead, emphasis is
placed upon favorably influencing the child through the employment
of care and correction. 10
Ohio Jurisprudence points out that the purpose of the Juvenile
Court Law is to "save minors of tender years from prosecution and
conviction on charges of misdemeanors and crimes and to relieve them
from the consequent stigma attached thereto. . ." 11 Other states, notably
California and New York, attempt to provide statutorily for care and
12
additional protection to be afforded to youthful offenders.
4 Id. § 502.
5 Id. §§ 507, 508, 509, 510.
6 Ohio Rev. Code § 2151.02 Delinquent child defined.
§ 2151.021 Juvenile traffic offender defined.
§ 2151.022 Unruly child defined.
§ 2151.03 Neglected child defined.
§ 2151.04 Dependent child defined.
7 Supra n. 1.

8 Calif. Well. and Inst. Code § 503 (West 1966).
9 N.Y. Fain. Ct. Act § 782 (McKinney 1963).
10 Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St. 443, 5 Ohio Op. 59, 200 N.E. 473 (1936).
11 33 Ohio Jur. 2d, Juvenile Courts § 4 (1958).
12 Supra, n. 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and infra, n. 16, 17.
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Treatment of Juveniles
In caring for delinquents, the emphasis has been placed upon rehabilitation, re-training, and general programs of restoration, in an
attempt to direct a misguided youth. These developments are helpful
3
in solving the problem, but their effectiveness is of questionable value.'
California provides by statute that the juvenile's probation officer
should recommend a disposition of the case to the judge, 14 and further
has a code section permitting destruction or sealing of the juvenile's
record after five years. 15 And the legislature in Ohio, following the
California provision, permitted as recently as 1969, that delinquents
and unruly children (two of the five classes of juveniles under supervision of Juvenile Court) may apply to the court for expungement of
their record; or the court may initiate this proceeding on its own. 16
Thus, currently in Ohio, California, and New York, the trend is to
afford protection to the wayward youth, to try to provide help for
him as an individual through counseling and rehabilitation, and to aid
the delinquent in later life, particularly by permitting expungement
or sealing of the juvenile record.
Presumption of Character
In spite of all that is being done to protect and provide care for
juvenile delinquents, 17 too many have (regardless of the reason),
broken the law. We are cognizant of the courts desire on the one hand
to prevent the crime cycle from repeating itself and to allow for the
young person involved to have a second chance-a practice which ought
to be maintained.
In the opinion of this writer, the court's decision in the recent
case of State v. Hale,ls was a correct and valuable one. It facilitated
13 Personal interview with Mr. William H. Hill. He received his M-A. in Social Work
from the University of Michigan in May, 1969. Currently, he is employed at the Bureau of Juvenile Placement, Ohio Youth Commission. He has worked in the field of
Juvenile Correction for five years.
14

Calif. Welf. and Inst. Code § 581 (West 1966).

15 Id. § 581.
16 Supra, n. 1.
Protection comes both from the state legislature (outlined in notes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 16, 17, 18 supra) and by case law case (cited in note 10 supra) and by Federal
Case law as evidenced by recent decisions, notably, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct.
1428, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967) wherein it was held that procedural safeguards of due
process are applicable in juvenile proceedings, and U.S. v. Costanzo, 395 U.S. 441
(1968) which held that the burden of proof in a juvenile case, although a civil proceeding, is that of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See also, In re Whittington, 13
Ohio App. 2d 11 (1967), 42 Ohio Op. 2d 39, 233 N.E. 2d 333 (1967), vacated in, In re
Whittington, 391 U.S. 341, 20 L. Ed. 2d 625 (1967). Query as to the benefit offered to
the juvenile defendant, however, since much of the judicial informality is lost by the
requirement of strict application of legal tests and doctrines.
18 State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 50 Ohio Op. 2d 340, 256 N.E. 2d 239 (1969).
17
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justice and aided the court in arriving at the truth, even though this
involved exposing the existence of a juvenile record, seemingly contrary to the intent of the Ohio legislature.
The relevant facts of the case are as follows: The defendant, Jewell
Hale, was convicted of murder in the first degree. At trial, his mother
testified that he never had been in trouble with the police. A minister,
one Landis C. Brown, testified that the defendant was a good boy,
and, "This is the first time we ever heard about Jewell, anything wrong."
One Susie Allen testified for the defense to the effect that this was
Jewell's first offense.
In rebuttal, the state called Mr. Andrew McFarland, the Clerk of
the Franklin County Juvenile Court, who testified that Jewell Hale
had previously been charged with breaking and entering in the night
season, and that he subsequently had been found to be delinquent and
placed on probation. Also, a Franklin County probation officer identified the record as being that of Jewell Hale and testified that he had
served as probation officer for Jewell Hale. The trial court overruled
defense counsel's motion for mistrial, and permitted the testimony to
stand. 19
The question then that arises is that of the general presumption of
good character of any defendant. By general character of a party is
meant the reputation which he carries, or the estimation of him by the
members of the community where he has lived. 20 Generally, the repu21
tation of the defendant is limited in this manner.
The law regarding character presumption is rather well settled.
Ohio case law indicates that presumption favors the defendant's character and his good reputation. Until the defendant offers evidence of
his good character, the state, in its case in chief may not offer evidence
of his bad character or reputation. 22 Other authority generally holds
23
that the same is true.
Elaborating on the question of character, and speaking for the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Learned Hand pointed out
that generally the prosecution is not permitted to introduce any kind
24
of evidence of a defendant's evil character in order to establish guilt.
19 Id. However, see contra Malone v. State, 130 Ohio St. 443, 200 N.E. 473 (1936).
20 Griffin v. State, 14 Ohio St. 55 (1862); Booker v. State, 33 Ohio App. 338, 169 N.E.
588, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 652 (1929).
21 People v. Van Gaasbeck, 189 N.Y. 408, 82 N.E. 718 (1907).
22 State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E. 2d 742, 38 Ohio Op. 575 (1949); State
v. Ross, 92 Ohio App. 29, 108 N.E. 2d 77, 62 Ohio L. Abs. 562, 49 Ohio Op. 196 (1952);
Sabo v. State, 119 Ohio St. 231, 163 N.E. 28 (1928); State v. Pigott, 1 Ohio App. 2d 22,
33 Ohio Op. 2d 56, 197 N.E. 2d 911 (1963).
23 Greer v. U.S., 245 U.S. 559, 38 S. Ct. 209, 62 L. Ed. 469 (1918); People v. Greenwall, 108 N.Y. 296, 15 N.E. 404 (1888); State v. Remick, 156 Wash. 19, 286 P. 67 (1930).
24 Nash v. U.S., 54 F. 2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1932).
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Following Learned Hand's reasoning, an Ohio case which involved a
juvenile charged with two counts of first degree murder, including
killing a police officer, held that the law does not automatically fasten
guilt upon an accused person merely by the introduction of character
evidence which indicates that the defendant is predisposed to commit
25
a criminal act.

Other case law points out that the accused in a criminal case is
limited in presenting evidence that would prove such traits of character
that tend to make it improbable that he would or could have committed
the crime charged. 26 Another limitation is that the defendant is barred
from using one particular good action to establish his character in general. Evidence of specific acts of conduct of a person upon particular
occasions, bearing upon his character, is usually held to be inadmissible. 27 Additionally, evidence of the accused's good reputation can
be objected to on the ground of remoteness in time, but the resolution
of this question is left to the discretion of the trial judge.28
Further, it has been held that the reputation of a defendant is of
a special nature; if it is of a defendant who enjoyed a fine reputation
in Tennessee, where he spent summer vacations, but was domiciled
and resided in another state, his Tennessee reputation is not competent
29
to establish his general reputation.
The development of an interesting line of old New York cases almost a century ago suggests some problems earlier faced by the court,
which reflect modern rules as they are still law in New York. In Brandon v. The People, the court held that where a defendant takes the
stand in her own behalf, she becomes a competent witness, and whether
or not her character is in issue, she may be compelled to answer questions on cross-examination about her past. 0 The Brandon decision
was followed and held to be controlling in the case of Connors v. The
People. In writing that decision, Chief Justice Church pointed out
that if a defendant volunteers and consents to be a witness, he temporarily occupies that position and subjects himself to all duties and obligations thereof. Since he is a volunteer, he cannot complain if he gives
evidence which bears against him, because the primary cause of his
testimony arises from the fact that he is a volunteer.1 And finally,
State v. Ross, supra n. 22.
Id.
27 State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34; 82 N.E. 969 (1907); State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio
St. 128, 38 Ohio Op. 575, 84 N.E. 2d 742 (1949).
28 Strader v. State, 208 Tenn. 192, 344 S.W. 2d 546 (1961); People v. Green, 217 Cal.
176, 17 P. 2d 730 (1932).
29 State v. Farley, 112 Ohio App. 448, 176 N.E. 2d 232 (1960).
30 Brandon v. The People, 42 N.Y. 265 (1870).
31 Connors v. The People, 50 N.Y. 240 (1872), but see People v. Crapo, 76 N.Y. 291
(1879).
25
26
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the Chief Justice himself, writing six years after the Connors decision,
distinguished that case in People v. Brown, where he found that in spite
of the fact that a defendant becomes a witness and may thereby subject
himself to the duties of a witness, he does not waive his rights as a
defendant in the case, and he may not be compelled to answer certain
32
questions.
At what point in the proceedings does character become an issue
in the trial? Character can become an issue when defense counsel
offers evidence of general good reputation, as is done in an opening
statement to the jury,3 3 or by a single statement made by the defendant
himself about his character or reputation; 34 or, as in an Ohio case
involving an adult indicted for murder, if he offers himself as a witness
and testifies in chief, he is subject to a legitimate and pertinent cross
examination. 35
Cross-examination and Judicial Discretion
Once character becomes an issue, the burden of going ahead with
the evidence falls on the prosecutor. But, as with the limits on the
presumption, there are also limits on the prosecutor's right of cross
examination. One such limitation is that the testimony must not go
beyond the scope of the defendant's case in chief, unless specially warranted. In determining Ohio law on this point, for example, it is clear
that if evidence of the accused's good character upon a trait involved in
a particular case is presented by the accused, then by introducing that
evidence, the accused opens the question of his character and the state
may properly rebut such testimony-pertaining to the character trait of
the accused. 36 The state may not, however, introduce evidence not
36
intimately and directly connected to the case on trial. a

Another limitation on cross examination involved an interesting
36
juvenile case somewhat parallel to the case of State v. Hale, b where

the defendant was permitted by the trial court, and over the objections
of the prosecuting attorney, to testify as to where and how he had
spent the previous years of his life. In his narration, the defendant
neglected to mention his incarceration at the Boys Industrial School
while still a juvenile. Upon cross-examination, the prosecutor was permitted to inquire as to this part of the defendant's history. Thus, the
32
32a

People v. Brown, 72 N.Y. 571, 28 Am. Rep. 183 (1878).
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 5 L. Ed. 2d 783, 81 S. Ct. 756 (1961).

32b

State v. Williams, 337 Mo. 884, 87 S.W. 2d 175, 100 A.L.R. 1503 (1935).

33 Sabo v. State, supra n. 22.
34 Jackson v. State, 29 Ohio App. 416, 6 Ohio L. Abs. 248, 163 N.E. 626 (1928).
35 Hanoff v. State, 37 Ohio St. 178, 41 Am. R. 496 (1881).
36

Booker v. State, 33 Ohio App. 338, 7 Ohio L. Abs. 652, 169 N.E. 588 (1929).

36a State v. LaPage, 57 N.H. 245 (1876).
36b

State v. Hale, supra n. 19.
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37
defendant can waive the presumption which is in his favor. However,
in that case, no juvenile record was introduced-hence there was no
problem with the statutory prohibition on admitting such evidence.
The same is true in Michigan, where it was held reversible error to
refuse to allow cross-examination of an accused's daughter as to the
mere existence of her juvenile record in order to impeach her credibility.37a Generally, evidence of character may be used to attack the
38
veracity of a witness or to prove specific facts in issue.
It is upon the shoulders of the trial judge to determine when a
cross-examination question will be permitted to be asked of the defendant, and when an answer will be compelled, and whether or not
39
The status of the law
the rights of the defendant are being violated.
regarding judicial discretion in Ohio was defined by Judge Johnson
when he commented that the court has the discretion to limit crossexamination of the defendant on matters not relevant to the issue for
the purpose of judging the character and credit of the defendant from
40
However, rules of evithe defendant's own voluntary admissions.
dence indicate that it is perfectly permissible, and well within the
limitations of the Confusion of Issues and Unfair Surprise doctrines,
to question the defendant as to specific acts of misconduct on cross41
examination.
In a New York case it was held that the court in which a case
is tried may, in the exercise of its discretion, exclude disparaging questions not relevant to the issue, put on cross examination for the purpose of impairing a person's credit, and it may, in its sound discretion,
allow such questions where there is reason to believe they may tend to
promote the ends of justice. 42 The same is true in Ohio, where it was
held that on cross examination, pertinent questions about the past life
of the defendant may be asked of the defendant, or of the witnesses,
for the purpose of affecting the credibility of either the defendant or
43
the witnesses.
And evidence of a prior offense committed by the defendant, identical to the one for which he is now being tried, is not prejudicial if the
44
trial judge limits use of evidence to the credibility of the witness,

37 State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 23 Op. 50, 41 N.E. 2d 387 (1942).

People v. Smallwood, 306 Mich. 49, 10 N.W. 2d 303 (1943).
38 Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 69 S. Ct. 213 (1948).
39 City of Piqua v. Collett, 78 Ohio L. Abs. 216, 151 N.E. 2d 770 (1956).
40 Supra n. 35.
41 3 Wigmore on Evidence, § 981 (3d ed., 1940).
42 Third Great Western Turnpike Road Company v. Loomis, 32 N.Y. 127, 88 Am. Dec.
311 (1865), re-aff'd Greton v. Smith, 33 N.Y. 245.
43 State v. Baldridge, 75 Ohio L. Abs. 549, 144 N.E. 2d 656 (1956).
44 State v. Deboard, 116 Ohio App. 108, 21 Ohio Op. 2d 398, 187 N.E. 2d 83 (1962).
37a
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although evidence of collateral offenses is insufficient to establish either
probable guilt of the defendant or substantive evidence of the matter on
45
trial, and its admission constitutes reversible error.
Occasionally, however, an overzealous prosecutor may go too far
in his cross-examination, and may get a result such as that found in an
old Ohio case where the prosecutor asked pertinent questions about
the past life of the defendant, Wagner, for the sole purpose of discrediting him in the eyes of the jury. The prosecutor failed to produce any
evidence that the convictions resulted from the inquired-about indictments, since no convictions ever had resulted. This type of questioning
is considered prejudicial to the defendant and will not be permitted. 46
And it is the kind of thing that prosecutors are continually attempting
to circumvent. 47 For example, a defendant may be asked, but cannot
be compelled to answer, how many times he has been arrested in the
past. 48 A prosecutor may not ask a defendant if he had ever robbed
a store prior to the present robbery trial 49 (which would have been
reversible error had not the trial judge instructed the jury as to how
to weigh this evidence), nor may a prosecutor ask a defendant if he
had ever been tried for attempted theft, 50 (which was prejudicial error and hence reversible), nor may he inquire about indictments without substantial proof that such indictments exist. 51
Similarly, if testimony is presented, and is relevant, but unconnected to the case being tried, and it appears prejudicial to the rights
of the accused, error will result if no corrective measure is taken and
the error becomes apparent. 5la Should evidence be presented which
is flagrantly violative of the rights of the accused, with no objection
on the part of the defense counsel nor any applicable or pertinent jury
instructions, the defendant in such case will be deemed to have been
51b
denied right to counsel, in the wake of this reversible error.
Historically, the scope of cross-examination dictates that crossexamination is not limited to the subject matter of the examination
in chief, but is open to all matters pertinent to the issue on trial.52
Thus, while some jurisdictions prohibit questioning of the accused as
to his prior arrests, it may be permissible, 52a particularly when the
45 State v. Watson, 20 Ohio App. 2d 115, 49 Ohio Op. 2d 152, 252 N.E. 2d 305 (1969).
46 Wagner v. State, 115 Ohio St. 136, 24 Ohio L. Rev. 456, 4 Abs. 358, 152 N.E. 28

(1926).
47 Columbus v. Mercer, 118 Ohio App. 394, 25 Ohio Op. 290, 194 N.E. 2d 901 (1963).
48

Coble v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100 (1876).

49 State v. Witsel, 144 Ohio St. 190, 29 Ohio Op. 374, 58 N.E. 2d 212 (1944).

50 Ohio v. Crawford, 17 Ohio App. 2d 141, 46 Ohio Op. 2d 175, 244 N.E. 2d 774 (1969).
Supra n. 46, 47.

51

51a State v. Peters, 12 Ohio App. 2d 83, 41 Ohio Op. 2d 160, 231 N.E. 2d 91 (1967).
51b State v. Cutcher, 17 Ohio App. 2d 107, 46 Ohio Op. 2d 156, 244 N.E. 2d 767 (1969).
52 Legg v. Drake, 1 Ohio St. 286 (1853).
52a People v. Cunningham, 300 Ill. 376, 133 N.E. 270 (1921).
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defendant himself testifies and thereby makes himself an ordinary
2
witness.5 b
The Confrontation
Recalling that a defendant may place his character in issue in a
proceeding merely by calling witnesses to testify as to his character,
53
thereby waiving the presumption of character which is in his favor,
and perhaps subjecting himself to a liberal cross-examination to test
the validity of such testimony, 54 there seems to be no reason why these
same rules of evidence do not apply equally to adults with juvenile
records. That, however, is a special case which involves a statutory
requirement forbidding the use of a juvenile record to discredit a defendant.5 5 Thus, we return again to the problem. Under what circumstances, if any, is it permissible to admit evidence of a prior juvenile
conviction in a later adult proceeding? It is precisely this conflict, the
presumption vis-a-vis the statute, to which the case of State v. Hale,
addressed itself.
The Resolution
In an effort to overcome testimony which tended to establish the
non-existent good character of the defendant, the court held that where
a defendant or defense witness raises the issue of the defendant's character, and the court in its discretion refuses to permit reasonable crossexamination on such issue, the introduction of a juvenile record as direct
evidence to meet such character issue is not prejudicial error.5 6
To those who would argue that some other means could have been
found to rebut the testimony of the defendant's mother, his minister,
and Miss Allen, one must reply that a trial is not meant to be mainly
a contest between lawyers, nor a show for a panel of jurors. Rather
57
it is supposed to be an attempt to find the truth.
Conclusion
While children do need to be afforded protection, and not to be subjected to treatment as harsh as that given to adult offenders, nevertheless they ought not be allowed to hide forever behind the shield of
youth. When a crime has been committed, we should not pretend that
it has not happened. Protection for youth, yes, but not at the expense of
our social and judicial system.
52b

People v. La Verne, 84 Cal. App. 685, 258 P. 463 (1931).

53 Supra n. 44.

54 Lee v. State, 21 Ohio St. 151 (1871).
55 Supra, n. 10.
56

Supra n. 55.

57 3 Schweitzer, Trial Guide 1426 (1945).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1971

9

